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NAFTA: THE POTENTIAL EFFECT ON 
U.S. MANUFACTURERS 
Marnie A. Northrop 
Introduction 
A toolmaker in a small Midwest company 
talks about the dream house he can now afford 
to build because work is steady. Meanwhile, 
another worker not far away in the Midwest 
places a "For Sale" sign in front of her house 
because she has recently lost her assembly job. 
(Moffet, p. Al) These contrasting situations are 
both a result of industrial integration with 
Mexico. They illustrate the highly individual-
ized effects the proposed North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will have on U.S. 
manufacturing sectors. 
In the first scenario, the Snider Mold 
employee speaks of prosperity. The small man-
ufacturer of precision steel tool molds has been 
growing since it initiated an aggressive cam-
paign to increase its exports to Mexico. The 
company will continue to offer opportunities to 
skilled workers in order to continue the pro-
duction of goods Mexico needs to modernize. 
Snider Mold's sales have tripled since it 
began dealing with Mexico in the late 1980's. 
In addition, there is no threat of operations 
relocating because Mexico's mold-making 
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methods are outdated. Unlike the case in some 
other labor-intensive areas, here Mexican indus-
try is not competitive. (Moffet, p. Al) 
In the second case, the A.O. Smith 
Corporation employee fears relocation. This 
maker of a variety of industrial products has 
shifted many blue collar jobs south to Mexico. 
Smith has made the move in an attempt to 
reduce production costs. The company cannot 
survive while paying U.S. labor wages because 
it is not competitive in the global marketplace. 
Without the move, it would not provide any 
jobs. (Moffet, p. A7) 
Companies and workers across the United 
States are facing situations similar to those 
illustrated above. U.S. manufacturers contin-
ue to integrate with Mexican operations, espe-
cially in light of the proposed NAFTA. In recent 
years, Mexico has become dependent on the 
U.S. for investment, technology, intermediate 
goods, and a market for its exports. On the 
other hand the United States has sometimes 
taken a protectionist attitude and looked inward 
for the solutions to its economic problems. As 
the world becomes a global marketplace, the 
U.S. must expand its horizons to increase its 
industrial competitiveness. Mexico is the logi-
cal choice. 
In several sectors, the industrial policies 
of the two countries have become so inter-
twined that the border is not really a barrier, 
instead just a costly fact of economic life 
(Weintraub, p. 49). Multinational corporations 
already established south of the border include 
IBM, Whirlpool, Procter & Gamble, Zenith 
Electronics, and Motorola to name a few. To 
stabilize and expand the economic integration 
already begun, the leaders of the two nations 
initiated talks creating a free trade zone. 
Manufactured goods represent the largest 
percentage of U.S. trade. In 1991, manufac-
tured goods accounted for almost eighty-two 
percent of all U.S. exports. From 1987 to 1991 
total trade to Mexico increased 128.2 percent 
while trade in manufacturing increased 132.6 
percent. In 1991, 8.2 percent of U.S. total man-
ufacturing trade went to Mexico. (USDOC, 
International Trade Administration) In this 
paper, I will discuss the effects of NAFTA on sev-
eral major U.S. manufacturing sectors includ-
ing automobiles, textiles and apparel, steel mill 
products, glass products, electronic equipment, 
and machinery. I will focus on the impact of 
opening trade between the United States and 
Mexico. Because the effects vary by industry, I 
will discuss each sector separately. 
Background 
June 12, 1991, marked the inception of the 
negotiations for NAFTA between the United 
States Mexico, and Canada. Today the U.S. finds 
itself with a unique opportunity-the opportu-
nity to become the leading nation in what could 
be the world's largest trading bloc. The agree-
ment will create a trading bloc comprised of 360 
million consumers and an annual output of $6 
trillion. It is the brainchild of Mexican 
President Salinas de Gortari, the man respon-
sible for opening Mexico's doors and shifting 
the country toward a market economy. Under 
NAFTA most tariffs and trade barriers among 
the three nations will be phased out over five to 
ten years while remaining intact to the outside 
world. 
For the United States the benefits are 
threefold. First, NAFTA will eliminate the high 
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tariffs and barriers currently placed on its 
exports to Mexico, while maintaining those to 
outside competitors. This will lower the price 
of U.S. goods, thereby stimulating demand for 
them. This price advantage will spur export 
growth and create jobs at home. Secondly, 
NAFTA will lock in economic reforms institut-
ed by Salinas, whose term expires on November 
30, 1994. It will also eliminate the threat of 
Mexico raising its tariffs to fifty percent, the 
maximum level allowed under GATT. The terms 
of the agreement will perpetuate the more pre-
dictable business environment present under 
Salinas. This is vital to multinationals already 
established in Mexico and to those looking to 
invest. Finally, NAFTA will increase North 
American competitiveness in global markets. 
By integrating North America's three comple-
mentary economies, the U.S. will be able to 
exploit its comparative advantages and benefit 
from economies of scale. 
Mexico as a Partner 
Mexican Reform 
In 1982 a major financial crisis prompted 
dramatic economic reform in Mexico. The gov-
ernment was in danger of defaulting on its com-
mercial bank loans. To prevent this Mexico 
rescheduled its foreign debts and turned toward 
market oriented policies. In 1988 Salinas de 
Gortari, a Harvard graduate, was elected presi-
dent. His election catalyzed the economic 
reforms, which he continues to initiate today. 
Under Salinas more than half the government-
owned businesses have been privatized, and the 
maximum tariff rate has been lowered from one 
hundred percent to twenty percent. In addi-
tion, foreign investment caps have been lifted 
in two-thirds of Mexico's business sectors. 
Mexico has also partially opened sectors for-
merly closed to any foreign trade or investment. 
In the auto and electronics sectors, for exam-
ple, Mexico has abolished some of the remain-
ing non-tariff barriers to trade. (Embassy of 
Mexico, p. 2) NAFTA would further open these 
sectors, thus expanding a crucial market for 
U.S. manufacturers. 
These changes in policy have resulted in a 
shrinking of the annual inflation rate from 
nearly 160 percent in 1987 to fifteen percent in 
1992. (International Monetary Fund, p. 363) 
Furthermore, in the past few years the Mexican 
economy has grown at a rate of between three 
and four percent annually. These positive eco-
nomic indicators along with the recent trade 
liberalization have made Mexico attractive to 
foreign investors. The U.S. has benefitted from 
the propping of Mexico's doors, while NAFTA 
could fully and securely open them. 
Present U.S.-Mexico Trade Relations 
Geography makes Mexico a logical target 
for U.S. goods. Not surprisingly, Mexico is the 
United States' third largest trading partner, rep-
resenting a market of 89 million consumers 
with a GNP of more than $170 billion. 
(International Monetary Fund, p. 362) U.S. 
exports to Mexico have doubled since 1986; and 
of total Mexican imports, seventy percent now 
come from the United States. (USDOC, North 
American Free Trade ... , p. 10) 
Manufactured goods make up the largest 
and fastest growing area of trade between the 
two nations. Total manufacturing exports from 
the U.S. to Mexico have increased between 1987 
to 1991 from $12.21 billion to $28.4 billion. 
The manufactures trade balance with Mexico 
went from a deficit of $1,434 million in 1987 to 
a surplus of $5.4 million in 1991. Exports 
increased 18.1 percent while imports only 
gained 8.3 percent. (USDOC, International 
Trade Administration) NAFTA reforms will 
cause exports to Mexico to increase in two ways. 
Increased investment in Mexico will increase 
productivity, and thereby the standard of living. 
This will provide Mexican consumers with 
greater purchasing power for buying American 
goods. In addition, American goods entering 
Mexico duty free will have lower prices than 
imports from third-country producers and 
therefore will be in greater demand. 
One cannot study United States-Mexican 
trade without first noting the maquiladora 
industry. The program, which began in 1965, 
involves factories in Mexico using imported 
materials to produce products that are to be re-
exported. The sector has experienced tremen-
dous growth, from only twelve plants in 1965 to 
eighteen hundred plants in 1990. (Congressional 
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Research Service, p. CRS-20) In both Mexico and 
the United States the factories and their prod-
ucts receive preferential treatment under spe-
cial ownership and duty provisions. 
The Mexican government established the 
maquiladora program to entice foreign 
investors to build on its soil. Historically, 
Mexico has discouraged foreign investment. 
Outside of the maquiladora industry, ventures 
are restricted to minority foreign ownership. 
However, the maquiladoras are exempt from 
Mexican majority ownership laws and can be 
exclusively foreign-owned. (U.S. International 
Trade Commission, p. 1-5) In addition, inter-
mediate materials and production equipment 
can be imported duty free provided that eighty 
percent of the finished goods are exported. 
The final products exported to the U.S. 
also enter under special provisions. Under the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States (HTS), products comprised of U.S. com-
ponents assembled in a foreign country are 
taxed only on the value added. Certain prod-
ucts from the maquiladoras, including machin-
ery, also enter duty free under the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP). This eliminates 
duties on certain specified products from devel-
oping nations. Approximately forty percent of 
total imports from Mexico enter under special 
duty provisions, with nearly one quarter under 
the HTS provision. (Congressional Research 
Service, p. CRS-20) 
The maquiladora industry has benefitted 
both Mexico and the United States. The invest-
ment in Mexico has provided new technology 
for Mexican operations and has generated an 
estimated 500,000 jobs for Mexican workers. 
For the U.S., the participation in the program 
has decreased the cost of low-skilled assembly 
and created a market for U.S. made compo-
nents. The maquiladora industry has institut-
ed an integral trade relationship between the 
United States and Mexico that establishes a 
basis for the heightened economic relations 
expected under NAFTA. (USITC, p. 1-5) 
The Effect of NAFTA on U.S. 
Manufacturers 
The maquiladora industry provides a pre-
view for the possible effects of NAFTA on the 
U.S.manufacturing sector. The facilities already 
located in Mexico have allowed many U.S. com-
panies to remain in business. As companies 
struggle to remain competitive in global mar-
kets, many jobs lost to Mexico would have even-
tually migrated to Asia to take advantage of 
lower labor wages there. However, in light of 
NAFTA, low-skilled operations are being relo-
cated to Mexico instead. For example, Hoover 
Co. currently makes hand held vacuums in Asia, 
but plans to shift production to Ciudad, Juarez. 
(Anders, p. R7) In another instance, AT&T has 
avoided distributing answering machines pro-
duced by Asian companies by manufacturing its 
own units in Guadalajara. (Davis, p. R8) By look-
ing south and developing Mexican industry, the 
U.S. can thus remain competitive while also 
strengthening one of its major export markets. 
Joint production with Mexico, i.e., the 
assembling of U.S. components in Mexican fac-
tories, will stimulate demand for U.S. products 
in North America and abroad. In Mexico, the 
demand will be for intermediate and finished 
goods. Abroad, U.S. products will be more com-
petitive due to the decreased costs and 
increased efficiencies arising when each coun-
try manufactures goods in which it has a com-
parative advantage. Without NAFTA, the jobs 
lost to Mexico in the short term would most 
likely be lost to the Pacific Rim. As a result, 
fewer U.S components and machinery would be 
purchased. By integrating with Mexico, the U.S. 
will thus still supply capital goods and input 
materials, thereby maintaining these jobs at 
home. 
Many fear that increased imports from 
Mexico will harm some U.S. industries, such as 
textiles and apparel. However, the United 
States' primary competition here is from Asia, 
not Mexico. In many industries North 
American producers do not directly compete, 
but instead complement each other. A free 
trade agreement would therefore allow each 
nation to exploit its comparative advantages, 
eventually leading to integrated North 
American production and economies of scale. 
In a survey of 455 senior executives of U.S. 
companies conducted for the Wall Street 
Journal, eighty-one percent said they were 
"strongly" or "mostly" in favor of NAFTA. The 
study showed this support was greatest among 
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companies employing over five hundred work-
ers. In addition, forty percent indicated an 
intent to shift some manufacturing to Mexico, 
although thirty percent recognized that some 
job dislocation would result. (Anders, p. R1) 
Executives favor NAFTA because it will create a 
stable business environment in Mexico, while 
guaranteeing access to the export market. It 
will allow U.S. firms to invest with confidence 
and to eventually realize increased efficiency 
and productivity while paying lower costs. 
Several comprehensive studies have been 
done to predict the overall effect of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement on the U.S. 
economy and industry. One such study, con-
ducted by Professor Clopper Almon of the 
University of Maryland, was based on a se\!en-
ty-eight sector U.S. model and a seventy-four 
sector Mexican model. (Shiells, p. 1) It pro-
jected that total U.S. employment would 
increase by 29,300 to 44,500 workers over the 
next five years if NAFTA were implemented. It 
also predicted that motor vehicles, computers, 
communication equipment, plastic products, 
and metal products would experience the 
largest absolute increase in exports to Mexico. 
Furthermore, Almon estimated that in ten years 
total exports to Mexico would increase seven-
teen percent (with tariff removal only) to twen-
ty-seven percent (with the removal of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers). However, the scope of the 
study is limited. The policy changes considered 
include only tariff reduction and the removal of 
major non-tariff barriers. It also does not take 
into account the liberalization of Mexican 
investment restrictions. More work is needed 
if the estimates are to indicate the effects of the 
removal of all non-tariff barriers. In addition, 
the estimates do not reflect several potential 
effects of NAFTA, such as scale economies and 
imperfect competition. These factors often cre-
ate larger aggregate benefits from trade liber-
alization. (Shiells, p. 5) 
Another study showing that NAFTA would 
benefit the United States was done by the Policy 
Economics Group of KPMG Peat Marwick. This 
study analyzed forty-four business sectors in 
both the United States and Mexico and con-
cluded that the agreement would have a small 
but still positive overall effect on the U.S. econ-
omy. The study predicted that U.S. exports 
could grow by $18 billion (approximately a fifty 
percent increase) in the short term, while it 
anticipated a five percent increase in demand 
for U.S. exports in the long term. In addition, 
the KPMG researchers expect a free trade agree-
ment to increase the price U.S. manufacturers 
receive for their exports and thus improve the 
United States' trading balance with the rest of 
its trading partners. ("New Study ... ," p. 2) 
Before negotiating NAFTA the U.S. feder-
al government requested several studies by 
commissions and advisors from the private sec-
tor. In one report, The Likely Impact on the 
United States of the Free Trade Agreement, the 
United States International Trade Commission 
(USITC) analyzed nineteen industries in man-
ufacturing, services and agriculture. The 
results showed that NAFTA would likely create 
overall net economic benefits for the U.S., 
although these would be small in relation to the 
magnitude of the U.S. economy. Furthermore, 
it was predicted that NAFTA would have mod-
erate-to-significant effects on U.S.-Mexico trade, 
but a negligible impact on U.S. production lev-
els overall. The USITC study for the major U.S. 
industries consisted of three approaches. First, 
a quantitative analysis was done to predict the 
effect of NAFTA on import and export prices of 
affected industries and the resulting changes in 
U.S. trading levels for each industry. Second, 
the commission conducted interviews with 
experts in industry, government, trade and 
academia. Third, a qualitative analysis was done 
to assess the impact on U.S. trade of nonprice 
factors such as investment. (USITC, p. x) The 
results for several of the major U.S. manufac-
turing sectors are discussed in the following 
sections. 
Automotive Products 
The automotive sector represents the 
largest component of manufacturing bilateral 
trade between the United States and Mexico. In 
1990 Mexico was the fourth largest supplier of 
motor vehicles and parts to the U.S., ranking 
behind Japan, Canada, and West Germany. At 
the present time, most Mexican auto products 
enter the U.S. at a two-to-three percent tariff or 
even duty free under the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule or Generalized System of Preferences. 
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However, U.S. goods exported to Mexico are 
subject to twenty percent tariffs and/or restric-
tive non-trade barriers. 
The most detrimental limitations cur-
rently obstructing U.S. exports to Mexico are 
local content rules, import restrictions , 
Mexican foreign investment restrictions, and 
performance requirements. At present, autos 
made in Mexico must have a minimum of thir-
ty-six percent Mexican content. In addition, 
auto imports are limited to twenty percent of 
total Mexican consumption, and (excluding the 
maquiladora industry) foreign investment in 
the automobile sector is restricted to forty per-
cent ownership. (USITC, p. 4-17) Mexico also 
stipulates that this sector must maintain a pos-
itive trade balance. To achieve this, it requires 
that for every dollar of auto products imported, 
two dollars of Mexican goods must be export-
ed. (USITC, p. 4-18) These restrictions add sig-
nificant costs to companies producing for the 
Mexican market. If these restrictions are 
enforced against the Japanese and Europeans, 
but with NAFTA no longer apply to the United 
States, the Big Three U.S. auto makers would 
clearly have an advantage in one of the fastest 
growing markets in the world. 
Furthermore, low Mexican wages provide 
a major incentive for relocating U.S. auto pro-
duction south of the border. At present, U.S. 
auto makers estimate payroll expense to be 
around twenty-six percent of input costs. By 
shifting low skilled jobs and paying Mexican 
workers four dollars per hour instead of thirty 
dollars per hour in the U.S., it is estimated the 
Big Three can increase their profit margins by 
four to ten percent. (Schott and Hufbauer, 
1992, p. 220) It is important to note that 
Japanese exporters have employed the cheaper 
labor skills of underdeveloped East Asian 
nations in thirty to thirty-five percent of their 
operations. This reduction in labor costs has 
made Japan very competitive in the global mar-
ketplace. NAFTA would give the U.S. the oppor-
tunity to utilize the differential labor skills and 
resources of North America to raise its level of 
competitiveness in global markets. 
In the automotive sector, the proposed 
NAFTA would create an essentially free trading 
bloc over a transition period of ten years. 
Mexican tariffs on autos and light trucks will be 
halved immediately, and then gradually phased 
out over this period. The Mexican domestic con-
tent requirement will also slowly diminish over 
ten years from thirty-six percent at present to an 
average effective rate of twenty percent, and 
eventually to zero. In addition, the Mexican trade 
balancing requirement of two dollars of exports 
for every dollar of imports will immediately be 
reduced to eighty cents, and will continue to be 
phased out until its elimination in the year 2004. 
(Schott and Hufbauer, 1993, p. 39) 
The treatment of third-country auto pro-
ducers gave rise to the greatest controversy in 
the negotiations. To safeguard against outside 
producers receiving preferential duty treatment 
under NAFTA, negotiators included a stricter 
rule of origin than the fifty percent precedent 
set in the Canada-U.S. FTA. For autos, light 
trucks, engines, and transmissions to qualify for 
special duty treatment, they must include 62.5 
percent North American content. The domestic 
content must be sixty percent for other vehicles 
and parts. As a result, foreign auto makers oper-
ating locally will have to incorporate more parts 
produced domestically in order to enjoy unob-
structed access to North American markets. 
(Schott and Hufbauer, 1993, p. 41) 
An integrated North American automotive 
industry would increase competitiveness in all 
three member nations. NAFTA would create 
competition in Mexico, forcing companies to 
update technology and increase efficiency. In 
the U.S., it would encourage unionized labor to 
update worker skills instead of haggling for 
compensation and job security. (Schott and 
Hufbauer, 1992, p. 222) Furthermore, global-
ization of the market would allow manufactur-
ers to produce autos in one region and sell 
them in another. In light of the agreement, U.S. 
auto makers are expected to restructure their 
Mexican operations to increase specialization. 
It is likely that production of smaller, less 
expensive models will migrate south. Mexico's 
efficiency would also increase as it specializes 
in one or two models, allowing U.S. auto mak-
ers to concentrate on more expensive models. 
In ten years the North American industry will 
realize the full benefits of specialization and 
economies of scale. 
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Textiles and Apparel 
The textiles and apparel sector has voiced 
the most ardent opposition to the proposed 
NAFTA. Interests in this sector have an exag-
gerated concept of the level of Mexican compe-
tition and the possible effects of NAFTA. This 
industry is highly labor intensive, making third 
world countries natural competitors due to the 
disparity in wages. To capitalize on the lower 
wages, many U.S. producers have already shift-
ed operations to underdeveloped nations, 
including Mexico. 
At this time, most manufacturing of gar-
ments south of the border occurs under the 
maquiladora program. Historically, the U.S. has 
taken a protectionist attitude in this sector by 
imposing import quotas. However, in 1990 the 
U.S liberalized these quotas on the maquilado-
ra finished products in an attempt to spark U.S. 
exports of garment parts to Mexico. (USITC, p. 
4-38) From 1985 to 1990 bilateral trade in the 
textile and apparel sector has expanded from 
$469 million to $1550 million. As a result, the 
trade balance has shifted from a U.S. deficit of 
$109 million to a surplus of $17 4 million. 
(Schott and Hufbauer, 1992, p. 272) 
The misconception that Mexico is the 
greatest threat to the domestic industry is not 
easy to dispel, but in fact the Far East nations, 
including Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan, are 
the United States' chief competitors in this sec-
tor. On the other hand, Mexico is largest con-
sumer of U.S. textile and apparel exports. At 
present, Mexican exports to the U.S. are bound 
by less than twenty percent of the existing U.S. 
import quotas. In the textile sector, Mexico's 
lack of competitiveness prevents it from 
increasing its U.S. market share. Despite lower 
wages, Mexican costs are still twenty-five per-
cent to 150 percent higher than U.S. produc-
ers. (Schott and Hufbauer, 1992, p. 267) U.S. 
mills have reached world productivity levels by 
investing in technology and automation equip-
ment, while Mexico is far behind. However, in 
the apparel sector Mexico is more competitive 
because operations are highly labor intensive. 
To protect the North American textile and 
apparel industries, negotiators implemented a 
strict rule of origin policy. According to this 
policy, goods must pass a "triple transformation 
test" to receive special treatment. The test 
requires that finished products be cut and 
assembled from fabric made from North 
American fibers. (Schott and Hufbauer, 1993, 
p. 44) The U.S. will immediately remove import 
quotas on Mexican products meeting the rules 
of origin, while slowly phasing out quotas on 
Mexican goods that do not meet the guidelines. 
In addition, tariffs on textiles and apparels, cur-
rently at 11.5 percent and 22 percent respec-
tively, will be eliminated over a ten-year transi-
tion period. (Schott and Hufbauer, 1993, p. 45) 
DuPont and Warnaco corporations both 
support NAFTA. They believe the freer trade 
will enable them to take advantage of the wage 
and skill differentials between the labor forces 
of the two countries. They will realize the same 
economies of scale as their Asian rivals who 
already do the same. (Schott and Hufbauer, 
1992, p. 263) Competition from the Far East 
and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) has 
made the U.S. production shift to third world 
countries inevitable. However, relocating in 
Mexico makes it still possible to maintain 
domestic jobs in three ways. First, there is a 
greater chance the finished product entering 
the U.S. consists of domestic parts. (USITC, p. 
4-41) Second, there is less East Asian invest-
ment in Mexico than the CBI. Therefore, a 
Mexican gain in the North American market 
share does not benefit the United States' tough-
est competitors. Finally, prosperity and job 
growth in Mexico translates to greater con-
sumer spending power for other U.S. exports. 
Steel Mill Products 
The steel sector is an area of significant 
bilateral trade between Mexico and the United 
States. In 1990 Mexico consumed eighteen per-
cent of U.S. steel exports, second only to 
Canada. The U.S. market takes in fifty percent 
of all Mexican exports in this sector, and the 
United States currently enjoys a $300 million 
trade surplus with Mexico. (Schott and 
Hufbauer, 1992, p. 250) Recently, however, the 
U.S. steel industry has declined, losing business 
to Japanese firms with innovative management 
and cutting edge technology. In the 1980's, U.S. 
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steel employment declined from 399,000 to 
164,000. (Schott and Hufbauer, 1992, p. 249) 
The freer trade proposed under NAFTA will 
spark the already substantial trade between the 
member nations, and give the U.S. a price 
advantage over the Japanese. 
At the present time, tariffs and barriers 
exist on both sides of the bilateral steel trade. 
Until March 1992, Mexican steel exports to the 
U.S. were limited to less than one percent of 
total U.S. consumption by a voluntary restraint 
agreement (VRA). In return, Mexico was grant-
ed protection from U.S. unfair trade laws. 
(USITC, p. 4-37) Additionally, U.S. tariffs on 
steel imports range from 0.5 to 11.6 percent. 
On the other side, Mexico levies a tariff on 
imports ranging from ten to fifteen percent. 
With freer trade both exports and imports 
are predicted to expand. U.S. export growth is 
projected to be especially strong in the areas of 
higher value sheet products and non-flat rolled 
products. Materials from the first area will be 
applied as inputs for the automotive and appli-
ance industries, while the latter will be utilized 
in the Mexican construction and oil industry. 
(USITC, p. 4-35) U.S. imports from Mexico will 
be most evident in stainless and tool steel, cer-
tain tubular products, and price-sensitive prod-
ucts used in construction. (USITC, p. 4-37) 
Machinery and Equipment 
The machinery and equipment sector is 
divided into two primary areas-household 
appliances and general industrial machinery, 
tools, and equipment. Overall, this sector is 
expected to be favorably affected by NAFTA, 
especially given Mexico's need for capital goods. 
At present, U.S. exports to Mexico are subject-
ed to duties of ten to twenty percent while most 
U.S. imports enter duty free under the GSP. 
(USITC, p. 4-34) 
U.S. and Mexican production in household 
appliances is complementary. U.S. exports con-
sist mainly of large refrigerators while imports 
are mostly small refrigerators. In the short 
term, the elimination of the tariffs should 
increase U.S. exports, while having little effect 
on U.S. imports. Appliances from Mexico 
already enter at a reduced rate under the 
maquiladora program or GSP. In the long run, 
NAFTA could effect U.S. household appliance 
industry in two ways. If it establishes uniform 
energy standards for appliances, production 
will become more complicated and expensive. 
In an attempt to cope with rising costs, manu-
facturing will likely shift to Mexico. (USITC, p. 
4-34). Secondly, Mexico could slowly expand 
its share of the U.S. market of certain appli-
ances, depending on its ability to improve its 
infrastructure. (USITC, p. 4-35) 
Trade in general industrial machinery is 
currently concentrated in the maquiladora sec-
tor. If tariffs are lifted, U.S. exports to Mexico 
are expected to increase in the short run. The 
lower prices of U.S. goods will make them more 
attractive to buyers. In addition, Mexican 
demand for machinery and tools will rise as the 
nation modernizes its facilities and develops its 
infrastructure. (USITC, p. 4-34) However, in 
the long term U.S. export production for 
Mexico may decline. As Mexican moderniza-
tion progresses, demand for industrial machin-
ery will decrease, and efficiency in Mexican 
manufacturing will increase. (USITC, p. 4-35) 
Glass Products 
The glass products sector can be divided 
into three main areas-fiber optics, television 
tubes, and household glassware-each having 
its own interest in NAFTA. An agreement 
would remove the tariffs on fiber optic trans-
mission systems. If NAFTA is implemented, 
communications between Mexico and the 
United States are projected to double in the 
next few years. This will generate demand for 
telecommunications equipment, including 
fiber optic networks. Corporations such as 
Corning Incorporated hope to capture this high 
growth market. (Larson, p. 4) 
In television tube manufacturing, pro-
duction sharing with Mexico has raised the 
competitiveness of U.S. producers. Zenith 
Electronics Corporation established operations 
in Mexico to combat heated competition from 
foreign-owned rivals. By locating in Mexico 
instead of the Pacific Rim, the company pre-
served intellectual property and the supporting 
technical jobs in the U.S. The lower prices 
associated with producing in Mexico have gen-
erated sales and allowed Zenith to begin new 
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ventures. This has created new jobs in addition 
to maintaining jobs at Zenith's suppliers. 
(USDOC, North American Free Trade ... , p. 31) 
Under the proposed NAFTA, television tubes 
made in any of the three member nations can 
be sold duty free in all of North America. 
Foreign producers will suffer a disadvantage as 
duties of fifteen percent will be levied on their 
products. (Larson, p. 3) 
In household glassware, U.S. producers 
exhibit great concern about liberalizing the 
present trade regulations. The United States 
currently applies an average tariff of twenty-
two percent on entering products, making an 
increase in imports likely in this commodity. 
Several domestic companies favor a protec-
tionist policy, recognizing the domination of 
Vitro Crisa in the Mexican market and fearing 
stiff competition from Mexican imports. 
(USITC, p. 4-31) Libbey has urged that the 
industry be excluded from an agreement, while 
Indiana Glass warned negotiators to seriously 
consider the negative impact NAFTA could have 
on U.S. domestic producers. Libbey cited a 
report by the International Trade Commission 
that claims that Mexico can price its beverage-
ware at twenty to thirty percent below U.S. lev-
els. It is estimated that labor constitutes almost 
half of the production costs of household glass-
ware. Therefore, U.S. manufacturers feel they 
cannot overcome the average wage differential 
of approximately fourteen dollars per hour. 
("Glassmakers' Complaints Aired ... ," p. 1) On 
the other hand, glassware giants such as 
Corning support NAFTA and favor rapid 
removal of existing tariffs. With plans to export 
its entire product line ("Glassmakers' 
Complaints Aired," p. 2), Corning feels that the 
industry can only benefit from a stronger 
Mexican consumer base. (Larson, p. 6) The 
USITC believes that the impact on U.S. pro-
ducers will also be dampened by consumers' 
tastes. Many Americans prefer reputable brand 
names, and wish to purchase patterns similar 
to those already owned. (USITC, p. 4-32) 
Under NAFTA, present tariffs and barriers 
imposed on glass products will be phased out 
over fifteen years, an exception to the ten-year 
transition period of the overall agreement. This 
result, coupled with the strict rules of origin 
requiring 62.5 percent of content to be creat-
ed in North America, is a compromise to inter-
ests both against and in favor of NAFTA. It will 
provide a transition period for U.S. producers 
to adjust to the anticipated presence of Mexican 
glassware in the domestic market. 
Electronic Equipment 
The electronics sector is characterized by 
production concentrated in the maquiladora 
sector. Here Mexican production is highly inte-
grated with its U.S. counterparts. U.S. produc-
tion focuses on capital intensive goods, requir-
ing a highly skilled work force. U.S. investment 
in the maquiladoras has been considerable 
given the low wage rates and proximity to the 
world's largest electronics market. (USITC, p. 
4-26) Companies located in the U.S. have also 
benefitted from investment in Mexico. For 
example, Gibbons Electronic Company makes 
castings in a maquila (factory) in Juarez. Since 
shifting production south, the company has 
doubled its work force at home. (US DOC, North 
American Free Trade ... , p. 32) 
Outside of the maquiladora sector, U.S. 
manufacturers are also capturing Mexican busi-
ness. For example, Control Module supplies 
Servicios Cupones with microprocessor-based 
bar code equipment. To satisfy orders, it has 
expanded operations and employment. (US DOC, 
North American Free Trade ... , p. 30) At the pre-
sent time, Mexico levies an average tariff of six-
teen percent on U.S. exports of electronic equip-
ment, in contrast with the five percent U.S. tariff 
placed on Mexican exports. (USITC, p. 4-26) For 
this reason U.S. exports are anticipated to 
expand, while imports are expected to increase 
negligibly if NAFTA is ratified. Although trade 
would increase, the overall impact on the U.S. 
electronics industry would still be minimal due 
to the relative size of trade between Mexico and 
the U.S. in relation to total volume of the U.S 
industry. Manufacturers most likely to benefit 
are the makers of products used to modernize 
Mexico's facilities and infrastructure such as 
computers and telecommunication equipment. 
(USITC, p. 4-28) 
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Conclusion 
Negotiations for NAFTA concluded in 
August 1992. The leaders of all three member 
nations signed the agreement on December 17, 
1992, and it now awaits ratification. If approved 
it will take effect on January 1, 1994, breaking 
down the border between Mexico and the U.S., 
a costly economic barrier. The agreement will 
broaden the scope of the market and increase 
access to a range of labor skills. (Schott and 
Hufbauer, 1993, p. 3) In return, greater North 
American competitiveness in global markets 
will develop. 
In 1992, the United States had a $6.8 bil-
lion trade surplus with Mexico. With free trade 
this figure is projected to reach $7 to $9 billion 
by 1995. The combined efficiency benefits and 
growth stimulus resulting from NAFTA could 
exceed $15 billion. (Schott, 1993, p. 24) 
Numerous studies have shown that NAFTA will 
lead to increased economic activity in most U.S. 
sectors. In addition, Mexico will prosper as well. 
Economic growth in Mexico will not only 
strengthen the United States' third largest 
export market and increase the Mexican stan-
dard of living, but it will also reduce illegal 
migration to the U.S. 
To achieve these goals, NAFTA will 
undoubtedly lead to some worker dislocation, 
primarily certain blue collar workers. However, 
these losses are in the short term. To succeed, 
NAFTA must be viewed as a long term oppor-
tunity. Many U.S. companies are establishing 
plants in Mexico to reduce costs and increase 
their competitiveness. As these manufacturers 
experience growth and increased profits, they 
must reinvest in training for low skilled work-
ers. Only if U.S. workers become more skilled 
and companies invest in new technologies will 
the U.S. receive lasting benefits. The greatest 
impact of NAFTA will be higher incomes for 
North Americans resulting from greater effi-
ciency and faster growth. In addition, a coop-
erative North American market will allow firms 
to realize economies of scale and enable each 
country to manufacture and export those prod-
ucts in which it has a comparative advantage. 
(Schott and Hufbauer, 1993, p. 22) 
Former President Bush stated the ideals 
of the agreement when he said: "I want manu-
facturers in Cleveland to enjoy virtually the 
same access to markets in Monterrey as they 
now have in Minneapolis. And with new tech-
nologies, creators of services in Denver may be 
able to tap markets in Santiago as readily as 
those in Chicago." ("Remarks," p. 3) NAFTA will 
create the competitiveness needed to battle the 
European Community and Pacific Rim nations. 
An integrated North American market will place 
the United States at the forefront of the emerg-
ing global market. 
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